INTRODUCTION
In this paper, by identifying some deep diferences between domestic and international law, I shall present some arguments about what international law is not, and about what its key players do not want. If I am right, there is a risk that some discourses on international law -those that underestimate these differences -sacriice neutrality on the altar of an ideological pursuit or are, at the very least, victims of irrational hope. 2 Of course, the fact in itself that a theory has a normative goal is not a problem at all. he problem arises when the line between description and prescription is blurred. 3 Statements about actual law lose all pretension to scientiicity if there is an evident mismatch with the reality they pretends to purport. 4 Such statements would be meaningful if and only if we reinterpreted them as statements about the ought of a legal order 5 or about a possible future world. And, if this future world appeared very remote or clearly unbelievable to the majority of observers, it would belong to the utopian discourse. 6 Utopia may be a good thing as long as all confusion is avoided. Nevertheless, when a utopian attitude is very powerful and pervasive, observational activity may be, even if unconsciously, distorted.
he issue is not trivial. Although some have argued that "if as international lawyers we want to participate and ind consolation in the utopian project of international law, we need to do this not as scholars, but as practitioners", 7 others have replied that, given an appropriate distinction between a 'realistic' and an 'illusionary' utopia, the irst one is "emphatically the province of legal scholars". 8 Maybe this province is not monolithic, and this reply makes sense only if we refer to (mainstream liberal) constitutionalist legal scholarship. 9 his contrast shows that there is a plurality of international legal theories (and scholars). he realistic utopia proposed by Cassese in his recent book 10 seems to be a paradi-2 About the concept of hope and its rationality, see Pettit 2004. 3 According to Kennedy (2011) , this overlap between description and prescription, theory and practice, conceptual analysis and critical reform, is probably a typical trait of the post-realist legal scholarship. 4 his is the case, according to Condorelli (2012: 156) , of the hope for a future judicial review of the UN Security Council resolutions. 5 As underlined by Mégret (2012: 75) , from an idealist perspective, " [i] nternational law is, in a sense, because it must be". 6 When we believe, for certain, that something will not happen, there is no room for rational In this article, I shall spend some more lines on the reconstruction of the Dworkinian approach to international law, not only because it is less known amongst internationalist scholars than Cassese's works, but also because it shares some form of optimism with Cassese. Reasonable stability vs. radical indeterminacy
journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu gmatic example of the reformist trend. 11 he prominent reformist Lauterpacht once said that "the more international law approaches the standards of municipal law, the more it approximates those standards of morals and order which are the ultimate foundation of all law"; the strongest reason that he had for defending the improbable domestic analogy was the ight against the deniers of the legal nature of international law and their "insistence on the so-called speciic character of international law". 12 As long as the reformist attitude is, at least genealogically, deeply related to the domestic analogy, 13 I think that taking the diference between domestic and international law seriously is salutary. If this diference is too deep, then reformists (those who believe in a realistic utopia) have to be reclassiied as idealists (those who believe in an illusionary utopia). 14 To understand how some diference can be deep, I shall introduce the notion of 'deep convention' and the notion of 'value-based law' , suggesting that rule--based law and value-based law are not built on the same deep convention (2). hen, I shall establish a connection between a rule-based model of decision--making as proposed by Schauer, 15 the concept of the 'rule of law' and the value of stability, and I shall argue that some universalising style of legal reasoning sets forth on a path to reconciling the sceptical particularist claim with the formalist claim of stability (3). Finally, I shall claim that, even if indeterminacy potentially afects both domestic and international law in a similar way, only the irst, by virtue of a more formalistic judicial reasoning, maintains itself as a relatively stable legal system. For a domestic legal system to be a rule of law, key players have to share the need for a high level of predictability. Even if in many cases they disagree about what the right answer is, they agree about the necessity of making decisions that could constitute, at least potentially, a precedent. 16 11 Mégret 2012: 79-80. 12 Lauterpacht 2011: 440. As pointed out by Paz (2012a: 242), Lauterpacht's extension of "the tradition of the 'rule of law' … to the international level" is perfectly understandable. About the problem of the transplantation syndrome, see Puppo (2012: 220) , and, about Dworkin's philosophy of international law speciically, see Jovanović (2015: 451-453) and Çali (2009: 822) . 13 It is probably not true that the domestic analogy is constitutive of the reformist approach.
I recognise this point as long as it is not always true that the reformist scholar bases her approach on the domestic analogy. Nevertheless, it is still true that, from Kelsen through Lauterpacht to Cassese, the ideal which is supposed to inspire the reform of international law is constructed on the basis of the best expressions of domestic law, that is, the constitutional state. In other words, as long as the reformist takes the train of global constitutionalism, it is diicult to deny that such a train is moved (or has historically been moved) by a domestic locomotive. 14 In the last section, I shall take into account the philosophy of international law proposed by Dworkin (2013) as an example of both the domestic analogy and utopianism. 15 Schauer 1991. 16 he deep relation between the technique of stare decisis and the value of stability is stressed by Schauer (2012: 43-44) and Waldron (2012) .
By contrast, international law mismatches the model of the rule of law because of a deliberate deformalisation of law-ascertainment 17 and legal reasoning. he diference between domestic and international law is, therefore, placed on the level of legal institutions as responses to some deep purposes, social needs or, in the case of humanity-based law, oceanic feelings (4). he key idea of my argument is a functional conception of the rule of law. Despite the global constitutionalist mainstream that grounds the concept of an international rule of law on domestic analogies, I shall base my argument on a disanalogy. Given a functionalist conception of the rule of law, my conclusion will be that the institutions, which we refer to when we airm that a legal order fulils the requirements of the rule of law, are absent from international law, at least in some of its paradigmatic expressions, such as humanity-based law.
HUMANITY-BASED LAW VS. THE RULE OF LAW: A FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH
Deep conventions say something about the function of the game, while surface conventions say something about the functioning (or the structure) of the game. 18 here is one game, but two social practices. he second practice identiies the sources of international law; it is the practice of law-ascertainment. 19 he irst practice, normally invisible, constitutes the legal game itself. If we are actively looking for the rule which is applicable to some international case, when we disagree, for example, about the existence of a particular international customary norm -and perhaps even about the function of international law -it is because we agree about the possibility and the valuable character of the game (international law) and the existence of some social sources.
Such a distinction is ultimately relevant because of the existence of two fundamental legal practices and two questions about the legal game. he irst question is "Why do we play?", and the second "How do we play?". If there is a diference between domestic and international law, it can be found at a deeper level. Even if domestic and international players can play together in an apparently harmonic way, the reasons that they have for playing and, consequently, the deinitional properties of the game are profoundly diferent. To the extent that 17 About the actual tendency towards deformalisation, and the need for rejuvenating and revitalising a formalist approach (in law-ascertainment), see d' Aspremont 2011a. 18 he distinction between deep and surface conventions has recently been introduced in analytical legal theory by Marmor 2009. he same intuition, perhaps most articulated, was formulated by Tuori (1997) and developed by Siltala (2000: 151-267 I take seriously the answer to the question "Why do we play?", I have adopted a functionalist point of view. My functionalist approach emphasises the institutional character of law, the inseparability of law and social needs, but it does not deny that the functioning of such institutions relies on rules and even less that it can be aimed at satisfying the requirement of stability or, in Llewellyn's terms, of reckonability, taken as reasonable regularity. 20 In a nutshell: the realist or functionalist approaches are, in my view, perfectly compatible with a rule-based explanation. 21 My point here is that the deep convention of a non-pathological domestic law is certainly related to the notion of the rule of law. 22 Because everyone interested in legal and political questions probably has their own deinition of the rule of law, it is here necessary to stipulate a working deinition. I shall adopt a formalist/procedural 23 conception of the rule of law, as originally proposed by Dicey. 24 his stipulation is not arbitrary, because it most likely relects a relevant contemporary tendency amongst international scholars 25 and legal philosophers. 26 Dicey distinguishes between three meanings of the rule of law. I am, above all, interested in the irst two. he irst one is as follows: "[it is] the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the inluence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government"; 27 and the second: "[it is] the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary Law Courts". 28 A similar approach has been proposed by Waldron who identiies four features of the formal/procedural concept of the rule of law: 29 20 See Llewellyn 1960. 21 It should be noted that, contrary to the reading of American realism divulged by Hart (1994: ch. 7), Schauer (2011) suggests that Llewellyn has never doubted the possibility for judges to decide on the basis of pre-existing rules. 22 In this sense, a pathological legal system is still an instantiation of what we could call 'law' , but it does not fulil the requirements of the rule of law. 23 About the classical distinction between formalist and substantive conceptions, see Craig (1997) . 24 Dicey 1915 . According to Dyzenhaus (1999 , " [i] n the public law model of England and in those legal orders which follow the English model, the most inluential understanding of the rule of law remains that put forward in 1885 by Albert Venn Dicey". 25 See Chesterman 2008; Besson 2010: 172; Buchanan 2010: 89; Tasioulas 2010 : 115. 26 See Waldron 2012 Schauer 2012: 30-55; MacCormick 1999: 165 . he same conception -as stated by Dyzenhaus (1996: 644) -is implicit in Weber's rational authority: "all that legal order can do is to make social life relatively stable by making it to a large extent certain and predictable". 27 Dicey 1915 : 198. 28 Dicey 1915 : 189. 29 Waldron 2011 1. a requirement that people in positions of authority should exercise their power within a constraining framework of public norms rather than on the basis of their own preferences or ideology; 2. a requirement that there be general rules laid down clearly in advance, rules whose public presence enables people to igure out what is required of them, what the legal consequences of their actions will be, and what they can rely on so far as oicial action is concerned; 3. a requirement that there be courts, which operate according to recognized standards of procedural due process or natural justice, ofering an impartial forum in which disputes can be resolved, and allowing people an opportunity to present evidence and make arguments before impartial and independent adjudicators to challenge the legality of oicial action, particular[ly] when it impacts on vital interests in life, liberty, or economic well-being; 4. a principle of legal equality, which ensures that the law is the same for everyone, that everyone has access to the courts, and that no one is above the law.
he descriptive question of the function of international law can then be formulated in terms of the rule of law. If we adopt a functionalist approach, our attention has to focus both on the pragmatic objective of the rule of law, i.e., reasonable stability, and on its means, i.e., formalism and legality. Do international key players share these values embedded in the political project of the rule of law? Does international law fulil the requirements of the rule of law? A negative answer to the second question is problematic if and only if we give an airmative answer to the irst one. As long as scholars seem to agree about the correctness of the negative answer to the second question, the real disagreement concerns the irst one. If the answer is negative, the requirements of the rule of law are seemingly irrelevant in the international context. Such irrelevance neither means nor implies the negation of the mere existence of a legal system at the international level; it only means that such an international system cannot be judged -and its performance measured -on the basis of the criteria usually considered to be constitutive of the rule of law.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to introduce a working deinition into the second element of the sketched disanalogy, that is, to deine what I shall consider to be the reference of the expression 'international law' . As long as it is true that international law is characterised by fragmentation and is, therefore, a multi-dimensional practice, I shall identify, amongst several dimensions of international legal reasoning (or judicial function), a paradigmatic one, which probably aims to solve what Morgenthau calls tensions, 30 and which I shall take as my case study. Reasonable stability vs. radical indeterminacy
journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu he key players of this dimension are the "organs of a value-based international community", 31 whose irst strong performance was the consequence of World War II crimes, and whose main goal is the protection of humanity; this dimension's paradigmatic case is human rights and criminal courts. 32 In the humanity-based dimension, judges (and scholars) consider themselves to be part of a mission, the very purpose of a Kantian project: the global constitutionalist project and the universal path to perpetual peace are undoubtedly two paradigmatic features of this dimension.
I think the increasing presence of international law in both legal and political discourse is due to this dimension, probably because many international legal scholars imagine the future of international law through this potentially supranational and imperative dimension, as if it were the telos of international law. 33 he realistic utopia of international scholars is inseparable from this telos.
A foundational moment in the development of this dimension was undoubtedly the introduction of jus cogens in the Vienna Convention. hat experience shows paradigmatically what I try to demonstrate: international indeterminacy as a result of a deep disagreement between states, and probably as a result of the need to preserve the liberty of states. Taking into consideration that it was impossible to come to an agreement about which principles deserve the status of jus cogens, states introduced jus cogens as a validity criterion, but did not specify a formal list of jus cogens norms. So, a fundamental step in the construction of the value-based dimension of adjudication was characterised by a choice which avoided all formal criterion, a choice in favour of indeterminacy, a choice against rules, formalism and, inally, against the rule of law, a choice which inevitably sacriices the value of stability, which the next section is dedicated to. Fabri (2012 Fabri ( : 1053 . According to Mégret (2012: 75-76) , " [t] his idea that there is something prior -and, unmistakably, higher -than the state is the deining mark of idealism, and is particularly apparent in contemporary discourse that emphasizes the importance of human rights, for example, as a basic precondition of legitimate statehood". 34 It is possible to consider jus cogens norms in a diferent way: such norms work as the ultimate criterion of validity, and it is precisely due to this that they contribute to the enhancement of determinacy at the international level. his would be true if international courts determined the content of such norms efectively. his is the thinking, I guess, of many international scholars insisting on the positive contribution of the 
RULE OF LAW AND RELATIVE STABILITY: TAKING UNIVERSALISABILITY SERIOUSLY
Functionally, legality is, above all, a powerful tool to plan and control the behaviour of individuals, especially those who, in a given social group, do not share the planners' intentions. 35 It is probable that determinacy and stability were the needs which legality mechanisms satisied. hese needs explain the obvious formalistic preference for written legal sources, as well as for legal arguments based on the text, rather than on the spirit of law. 36 his connotation, if historically justiied, could be replaced with a better one: a rejuvenated (neo-or functionalist) formalism 37 is an important tool to understand how lawyers think 38 and eventually to impose a normative framework, especially in international law, a framework which is able to limit the efects of an increasing deformalisation of legal sources. 39 If we take rules seriously, we necessarily adopt a formalist-like point of view. If rules are not bad, then neither is some kind of formalism. In his book Playing by the Rules, Schauer defends a rule-based model of decision-making, according to which law is a set of rules, and rules work as entrenched generalisations. 40 he rule-based model of decision-making is not a guarantee of right answers or a miraculous remedy against indeterminacy. It is, plausibly, what we need if our purpose is to limit arbitrariness without denying the judicial use of discretion, discretion being a situation in which "some institution with the power to control or review will let stand a multiplicity of quite diferent decisions, including some that the controlling institutions might think wrong". 41 How could this miracle be possible? How could discretion satisfy the requirements of the rule of law? By, in our view, a neo-formalist insistence on the possibility of universalising discretionary decisions, that is, by conceiving a world in which indeterminacy and an acceptable level of stability are compatible.
Despite the inevitable feature of over-and under-inclusion, the stability of a national legal system is preserved if and only if the model of decision-making is of ius cogens to an increasing quantity of norms -the resulting panorama is nearer to what I claim in this paper than to the one considered by such optimistic opinion. rule-based and not a particularistic model (according to which judges, in each case, apply the solution that best satisies the underlying justiication of a rule). 42 he rule-based model treats "the form of a legal rule as more important than its deeper purpose". 43 Conversely, according to a particularistic model "no rule is more important than the reason for which it is enacted". 44 Notwithstanding the possible injustice of a solution, the rule-based model satisies the value of relative stability. his value is essential to the rule of law, whose social function is to establish the best conditions for agents to follow plans without solving diicult moral questions. 45 From Hayek to Waldron, several theorists have recognised constancy, stability and predictability as values protected and/or pursued by the rule of law. According to Hayek, the rule of law makes it possible "to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual afairs on the basis of this knowledge". 46 When the virtue of the rule of law is absent, "people will ind it diicult to ind out what the law is at any given moment and will be constantly in fear that the law has been changed since they last learnt what it was". 47 he fact that many of "the rule-of-law arguments for constancy involve the values of certainty, predictability and respecting established expectations" 48 has been perfectly captured by Schauer: In some way, according to Raz, (a formalist conception of) the rule of law is the virtue that can limit the dangers of both naked power and morality. On that, see also Koskenniemi (2002: 174) , referring to a turn to ethics in international law: "In such a situation, insistence on rules, processes, and the whole culture of formalism now turns into a strategy of resistance". his is so because "formalism is precisely about setting limits to the impulses -'moral' or not -of those in decision-making positions in order to fulill general, instead of particular, interests. " 48 Waldron 2012: 28. See also Beckett (2006 Beckett ( : 1068 By the way, the notion of indeterminacy is very ambiguous. 52 If we understand indeterminacy to be the absence of a determinate response to some relevant question, it seems plausible to me to distinguish between four levels of indeterminacy. he irst concerns the applicability of a determinate rule to some real situation (e.g., is a given situation a case of genocide?). he solution is indeterminate because we disagree about how we are to juridically qualify the facts of the case. he second concerns the identiication of the meaning of some legal provision (e.g., what does the term 'genocide' mean in the Statute of the International Criminal Court?). he third concerns the identiication of legal sources (e.g., does a speciic customary practice exist?). he fourth concerns the function or purpose of the whole institution. What is international law for?
Only the last form of indeterminacy is deep or radical indeterminacy. he irst three categories of indeterminacy are, in some way, a normal feature of any domestic legal system and are perfectly compatible with the formalism of the rule-based model of decision-making. What I mean to say is that the realist claim about indeterminacy is perfectly consistent with the formalist approach to decision-making. Radical indeterminacy, if present, underdetermines the other three levels: "we simply cannot (determinately, objectively or authoritatively) answer the question of what law says until we have answered the question of what law is". 53 Of course, this last statement needs some further explanations. According to the mainstream positivist approach, what the content of a legal system is does not depend on what law is for. he identiication of legal norms depends on social facts, and not on ontological considerations about the nature and/or purpose of a legal order whose content has to be identiied. But this approach, in some cases, as in Raz's theory, is explicitly limited to municipal law, 54 precisely because of the social sources (such as legislation) that have historically characterised journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law www.revus.eu municipal legal orders. When no strong social source exists -or, at least, when some crucial sources (such as customs, principles and jus cogens) 55 are diicult to identify -and when there is no supreme court whose rulings can authoritatively establish (even if not permanently, at least for a while) the normative content of a system, it is possible that what the content of law is will depend on some judgment about the deep values that are supposed to provide legal norms with moral justiication.
If such values are perfectly determined or, at least, judicially determinable, and there is no conlict between them, relative stability can be reached or, from a Dworkinian perspective, even judges could be able to formulate the right answers. But if such deep values are radically undetermined, uncertainty at the deepest level will inevitably project itself onto a more supericial level, that is, the level at which judges are supposed to apply the rules -previously identiied -to individual cases, as in the Ferrini case, a real international afaire that I shall take, in the next section, as an illustration of radical indeterminacy.
If we cannot deny that judges decide with discretion (whether great or small, it is beside the point), we can still think that when they use discretion or when they create a new rule, they can be limited by a universalisability test, 56 that is, by adopting the point of view of people who will potentially be afected in the future by this new rule, and it is from that point of view that they would accept the new rule as the best solution. 57 Universalisation gives form to the substance of a particular situation. 58 Even though, because of the indeterminacy of law, a solution is inevitably the consequence of some use of discretion, discretion is not necessarily arbitrariness 59 if judges submit themselves to the universalisability test. he prescription created is universalisable if judges think that the solution adopted will work in similar future cases, and it is due to this that it is able to create expectations. 60 Nonetheless, this is not always the case. In some cases, such as the Nuremberg Trials, as long as the solution is ultimately the consequence of the application of a set of rules created by a contingent winner to judge and criminalise a contingent loser, we have strong moral reasons to avoid all generalisations. by the good guys? he risk, underlined by Koskenniemi referring to Kosovo, is that "a beneicial illegality today makes it easier for my adversary to invoke it tomorrow as precedent for some sombre scheme of his". 62 When a solution is a universalisable solution, then judges can entrench the generalisation. To say that judges create a rule, if we use Schauer's theory, 63 means that -starting from the observation of a particular case and taking seriously a particular solution because of its universalisability -judges formulate the solution in terms of the consequence of a general rule.
If indeterminacy involves the necessary use of judicial discretion, the universalisability test works as a technique against arbitrariness. here are several ways of creating new law: not all solutions are equivalent. If it is true that judges, like legislators, make law, it is also true that the two institutions do not enjoy the same creative freedom. 64 Neo-formalistic reasoning excludes solutions that seem inevitably arbitrary as long as they are not universalisable. 65 If a solution seems to us to be universalisable, it is not because judges have adopted a neutral point of view. Actually, it is impossible for judges to neutralise their preferences. However, precisely because of this impossibility, the requirement of transparency and universalisability with respect to judges' preferences and decisions is an essential feature of predictable legal reasoning and inally of a formal-procedural, yet thick, conception of the rule of law; 66 formal because no substantive element is constitutive of it; thick because it is still an exigent conception according to which many legal systems, apparently ruled by law, would not satisfy the requirements of the rule of law. many international positivist scholars -from a positivist perspective (see Garibian 2007) . Such an attempt would have, I guess, perverted the deep value (legality or the rule of law) justifying the positive legal system. he decisions were just, but they had no legal justiication, they only had a moral one. In this way, Kelsen does not renounce his methodological positivism, which assumes, at the very least, a distinction between the law that is and the law that we desire. Nevertheless, neither does he adhere to an ideological form of positivism (or ethical legalism), according to which what is legal is also morally correct, and so it has to be obeyed. he law of the Nazi was (probably) legal and the law of Nuremberg was (probably) illegal, but there were strong moral reasons for preferring, in this case, illegality to legality. To defend the Nuremberg rulings on the basis of (an argument derived from) positive law would have threatened that which makes positive law be something valuable. More generally, on Kelsen's blurred lines between the purity of theory and the paciism of ideology, see Puppo 2015 . 62 Koskenniemi 2002b On the relation between the rule-based model and discretion, see Schauer 1991 : 190. 64 See Hart 1994 : 253. 65 Hart 1994 Transparency is, therefore, an essential feature of the culture of formalism. See Jouannet (2010: 294) and Paulus (2010: 209) . An example of a thick formal-procedural conception would be the conception proposed by Waldron. See Section 2 of this paper. Reasonable stability vs. radical indeterminacy 
DEALING WITH RADICAL INDETERMINACY: THE RULE OF LAW VS. OCEANIC FEELING
I shall take, as a starting point, an international case of radical indeterminacy: given the conlict between the jurisdictional protection of human rights on the one hand, and state immunity on the other, in the irst case decided by the Italian Court of Cassation the protection of human rights overrode the protection of sovereignty, while in a subsequent decision, decided by the International Court of Justice, the opposite occurred. 67 If international law is a human construct and if its goal is the satisfaction of a bizarre combination of moral (a matter of human beings) and political needs (a matter of sovereignty), it is easy to see that its indeterminacy depends, above all, on the manifest incompatibility between these two needs:
[T]he claim of indeterminacy […] is not at all that international legal words are semantically ambivalent. It is much stronger (and in a philosophical sense, more "fundamental") and states that even where there is no semantic ambivalence whatsoever, international law remains indeterminate because it is based on contradictory premises. 68 If we read the ICJ sentence and Cançado Trindade's dissenting opinion, we can clearly perceive the source of radical indeterminacy: the premise about the purpose of international law that the majority of judges accepted deeply contradicts the premise that the former judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights accepted. his case is clearly an example of international tension, in which it seems that domesticating judicial discretion is very diicult. Not surprisingly, judges, both domestic and international, are particularly unclear about the purposes, sources and inally the factual predicates to which they have to impute legal consequences.
In this section, I shall argue that, while non-pathological domestic legal systems are able to deal with radical indeterminacy, because of some profound institutional and cultural diferences, international law is irremediably afected by it. he importance and eiciency of the formalist approach in domestic legal reasoning and the deformalising tendency in international law can be explained from an institutional and a functionalist perspective. he comparison makes sense especially if we refer to international judges resolving humanity issues of criminal law and human rights violations -the judicial dimension in which a "turn to ethics" has been accompanied by an "increasing deformalisation". 69 In many domestic legal systems, judges receive some legal education, and perhaps they share a common legal culture, formalistic in nature in some sense. 70 Judges -as it is impossible to satisfy the formalist requirement of refraining from creating law -fulil their duty by creating new general rules to which they would be ready to submit themselves. 71 To the extent that international judges are oten international scholars, they have a diferent view of their role. hey cannot rest on the existence of a democratic government that deals with law reform. hey have to play an active role, as they have been educated to be reformers and not just the guarantors of stability that characterises the rule of law: the philosophical background of the very inluential German international scholarship was "the philosophy of optimism and action, struggle for progress and the perfection of the world". 72 he paradigmatic example was certainly Lauterpacht, "who never was tired of believing in human goodness and the ability of reason to ind this goodness, even in the darkest moments of European history". 73 So, if both domestic and international law sufer from the consequences of indeterminacy, only domestic courts have the tools, the culture and the institutional context to manage it consistently with the requirement of relative stability. By contrast, to the extent that international courts are oten confronted with diicult or even unique cases, universalisability is not an achievable goal and is, therefore and rightly so, not a priority. As Morgenthau had already sharply grasped seventy years ago that, unlike the domestic ield, a "political situation in the international ield is not likely to repeat itself, since the variety of factors of 69 Koskenniemi 2006 : 159. 70 Leiter (2010 conirms the same about the US: "formalism [...] is quite obviously the oicial story about adjudication in the public culture in the United States". 71 he best way of fulilling this duty is probably through what Llewellyn (1960) which it is composed makes for an indeinite number of possible combinations. Hence only a strictly individualized rule of law will be adequate to it". 74 I maintain that such an institutional diference deeply relects diferent social conventions, tending to satisfy basic needs or to achieve fundamental moral aims.
Domestic law could seem justiied, morally or socially, by virtue of its capacity to solve moral problems in a relatively stable form. What matters is that it solves problems, and not how it solves them. Given some "circumstances of legality", which "obtain whenever a community has numerous and serious moral problems whose solutions are complex, contentious, or arbitrary", 75 we can understand the purpose and authority of law. Because of the existence of a legal plan, we can avoid entering a balancing activity about what, in given circumstances, the best moral reasons for acting are. Koskenniemi shares the same point when he airms that, in normal domestic situations, "it is possible to live with automatic rules because the alternative is so much worse". 76 When international law (in matters of criminal or human rights law) tries to guide behaviours, it is confronted with two obstacles. Some subjects refuse to be led, maybe because they "disagree on what is good". 77 When states reject a model of conduct, they contribute to the introduction or the elimination of some customary law, and so to its indeterminacy. 78 Invoking imperative norms (jus cogens norms) is probably the only way not to bend against the dogma of the consent of states. hese norms, however, cannot have a social source, and therefore tend to increase the deformalisation of legal sources. 79 Such a solution, i.e., invoking imperative norms, unfortunately creates the second obstacle: the problem of the radical indeterminacy of moral values that justify the identiication of jus cogens norms. 80 In this state of indeterminacy, international law is not able to provide any plan; it can only generate a set of individual decisions in particular cases, oten in situations characterised by a moral or political emergency. 81 Even if we admit that a Dworkinian approach might be useful for explaining (some) domestic legal order, it would nevertheless be completely useless in the international context, which is characterised, as we have seen, by deep disagreements about moral values, and by the absence of both a supreme judicial body and a democratic legislative power, which are potentially able to solve, at least momentarily, these very disagreements. 84 Because of the deep character of international tensions, "it is naive and even counterproductive to expect them to be efectively resolved by judicial or arbitral devices". 85 Some points that make the Dworkinian theory implausible (unless it is a utopian one) could briely be mentioned.
82 According to Freud (1962: 11) , who borrows the expression from his friend Romain Rolland, an oceanic feeling is "a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded -as it were, 'oceanic' . his feeling [...] is a purely subjective fact, not an article of faith; it brings with it no assurance of personal immortality, but it is the source of the religious energy which is seized upon by the various Churches and religious systems [...] . One may [...] rightly call oneself religious on the ground of this oceanic feeling alone, even if one rejects every belief and every illusion". his notion of "oceanic feeling" is related to religions, but could also, more interestingly, be associated with a quasi-religious theme, such as international law. On this matter, see Koskenniemi (2012: 11) : "Although the 'oceanic feeling' may certainly be real to the extent that the speaker actually feels it, this is no proof of its universal reality, either in terms of being available to others, or its having some objective presence in the world. " Not surprisingly, Dworkin takes very seriously the notion of jus cogens and quotes judge Cassese as an example of "the moralized approach to international law that [Dworkin is] now defending" (Dworkin, 2013: 26 Kratochwil (2000: 42) , who recalls that "neither a constitutional text nor a doctrine of stare decisis apply in international law"; Beckett (2001: 635) : "the role of law, and the avoidance of radical indeterminacy in the Dworkinian analysis are all predicated on the centrality of the courts, or at least on the possibility of unilateral recourse to the courts. Dworkin relies on the courts to stabilize the law (and thus authoritatively determine which values are in the system), but in PIL they simply cannot play this role. " While it is plausible that the requirement of relative stability can generate, in a domestic context, and this according to Dworkin, some kind of associative obligation, "it is doubtful, to say the least, whether, irst, states can meet those psychological requirements, even through their legitimate representatives, and second, whether, even under this assumption, we can meaningfully speak of a sort of international community that generates associative obligations in the Dworkinian sense of the word" (Jovanović, 2015: 454 Firstly, to the extent that Dworkin seems to start from the radical conlict between human rights (essential in his theory) and sovereignty (essential, according to him, in any positivistic conception), 86 his position "is hardly in line with his general vision of the unity of value". 87 Secondly, Dworkin seems to recognise the deep institutional diference between the domestic and the international contexts, speciically with respect to adjudication, when he airms that "no such structure, in any but the most rudimentary form, is yet in place in the international domain, and none can be expected soon". Consequently, he describes his project -I ignore just how ironically -as a "fantasy upon fantasy". 88 Finally, it is interesting to summarise the conclusion that Dworkin sketches regarding the NATO bombing of Kosovo. He argues that it was perfectly justiied on the basis of the international law having been interpreted in its best light. 89 It is, nevertheless, surprising that Dworkin recognises that the legal interpretation implicit in his right answer "would be fresh legislation, of course, rather than an interpretation of the Charter as it stands". 90 Deinitively, it is unclear whether what he proposes is a realistic theory of international law or just some personal vision of what international law could/should be in some imaginable future.
CONCLUSION
If, because of its radical indeterminacy, it is very diicult to know which rules are valid at any given time, international law could be conceived of not as a set of rules, 91 but as a set of particular solutions to virtual unique events. 92 Of course, this claim needs some nuances. It is true that the phenomenon of radical indeterminacy, as long as it depends on the moral values incorporated into a legal system, is not exclusive to international law. Recent jurisprudence on jurisdictional immunity is evidence of this. In Italy, the Court of Cassation irst invoked higher values, and then an emergent customary norm, only to ultimately abandon its jurisprudence in order to comply with the international ruling of the ICJ and with a new piece of Italian legislation. Ater this, the Constitutional Court decided to reairm the same values implicit in the irst ruling of the Court of Cassation and declared the Italian legislative provision to be unconstitutional. 93 All this seems to demonstrate the deep indeterminacy of the rule of recognition. But, even if this is accepted, if a pluralist conception is endorsed, one could claim that the Italian Constitutional Court had the inal word on the matter, and so relative stability was achieved.
Such relative stability is the result of the reiteration of domestic judicial cases. For the same legal problem, in the international arena, only one case, the above mentioned Germany vs. Italy case, was decided, so that it is still unclear what the solution to potential future cases could be. An important diference that also strengthens my argument is that the inal word in the Italian saga was founded on the constitutional text, and not on a customary norm. his diference is relevant because the existence and the content of international customary law was precisely the object of the disagreement between the Italian and the International Court of Justice.
he history of international relations is maybe the history of "plans which brought about results diferent from those intended". 94 he deep need satisied by international law is probably not, or not only, legal and social stability, which is essential in the construction of a domestic rule of law. his might be only a matter of fact or lead to a serious ontological question: what is international law for? If it is meaningless to take the need for stability as an answer, it is not extravagant to suspect that its purpose is radical indeterminacy itself which, far from being a "structural deiciency", 95 could maximise -despite the good intentions of many (reformer) international scholars and the rhetoric of the United Nation 96 -the political freedom of states, even in the context of humanity-based law. 96 I have to acknowledge that the United Nations aim to guarantee international peace and security, which is comparable to social stability at the domestic level. Nevertheless, this statement has to be relativised both at the empirical and the normative level. Empirically, it is a fact that an international intervention with the purpose of re-establishing peace and security can be stopped by a veto, so that the states that have the right to stop such interventions can maximise their freedom, and so threats against peace and security remain actual. In other words, without a serious reform of the functioning of the UN Security Council, the argument is not convincing. he reason why such a reform has not been introduced is precisely because it would reduce the freedom of some states. In this sense, the empirical diiculty has to be understood to be the result of a normative stance aimed at protecting the liberty of states, or at least of some powerful states. 
